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CONTROLLED FLIGHT INTO TERRAIN:
HOW THE AIRLINES AND THE FEDEhOAL A VIA TION
ADMINISTRATIONARE ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM
Roger C. Matteson

ABSTRACT
Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) is not a new problem. It has been around since the beginning of manned flight.
A CFIT accident occurs when an airworthy aircraft, under the control of a pilot, is flown (unintentionally) into terrain,
water, or obstacles with inadequate awareness on the part of the pilot (crew) of the impending collision (Wiener, 1977).
It would seem that CFIT would be an easy problem to solve or reduce but unfortunately, that has not been the case.
CFIT is still the leading cause of all fatal aircraft accidents in the world. Figure 1 illustrates the CFIT accident rate
compared to other types of fatal airline accidents. It can be noted that CFIT is not the leading cause of the U.S. fatal
accident rate however, the world wide CFIT rate is still a major concern. This paper will address the issues as they
pertain to CFIT, to include the causes, prevention and the future aspects in dealing with CFIT.
Although the reduction of the CFlT accident rate has
been reduced over the years, there still is more that can be
done. The "Swiss Cheese" model of accident causation
illustrates that for an accident to occur, hilures have to
occur at several levels ofresponsibility(Reason, 1990). The
model illustrates the following:
1. Organizational Factors
- excessive cost cutting
- reduction in flight hours
2. Unsafe Supervision
- deficient training program
- improper crew pairing
3. Preconditions for Unsafe Ads
- loss of situational awareness
- poor CRM
4. Unsafe Acts
- failed to scan instruments
- penetrated IMC when VMC only
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5. Accident and Injury
- crashed into side of mountain (Reason,
1990)

The aircraft that pilot's fly today are the safest and most
complex in history. So why are we still having problems
with CFIT? The answer is as complex as the aircraft. As
pilots, we do not l i e to admit that pilot error could be a
contributing factor. If we cannot identify or r e h e to
recognize the source ofthe problem, then we cannot begin
to find a solution. Pilots must be willing to admit that they
are the weak link in the chain and approach this problem
in an aggressive manner. With the introduction of
has seen the CFIT
advanced avionics, the aviation in*
accident rate go down. Initial and recurrent training will
also be a key factor when approaching the problem.
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Figure 1 (NTSB, 1999)
Probable Causes of CFIT Accidents
To be able to find a solution, we have to look at some
specific accidents that the primary cause was CFIT. By
reviewing these accidents, wecan compile information that
was derived kom the accident investigation and begin to
recognize some common causal factors. One of the more
recent accidents involved an American Aiilies B-757near
Cali, Columbia on December 20, 1995. Although several
factors led to the accident, situational awareness of the
cockpit crew seemed to very low, which led to the impact
with a mountain peak. According to Dr. Mica Endsley fiom
theUniversityofSouthernCalifornia, situationalawareness
can be defined as 'The perception of elements in the
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environment,the comprehension oftheir meaningandtheir
projection into the near future" (Mancuso, 1995). In other
words, the crew did not lmow their location at a critical
time of flight.
It should be noted that the Cali accident was not
investigated by the National Traffic Safety Board (NTSB)
but by Columbia's Aeronautics Civil which is the
Columbian equivalent of our Federal Aviation
Admimistration (FAA) (Garrison, 1997). In the accident,
the crew reportedly entered the wrong data into the flight
management computer (FMC)and commanded the aircraft
to go the Romeo Non Directional Beacon (NDB) versus the
RozoNDB pornhein, 1996). Rozo was the correct NDB to
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use for the approach into Cali. The flight crew failed to
recognize that the new data entered into the FMC would
take them off course. American Airlines proposed that the
flight crew's M u r e to perceive the FMC-initiated turn
away Eom the intendedrouting, was one probable cause for
the accident (Dornhein, 1996). From that moment on, they
were not fully aware of their location.
Other probable causes that were brought out in the
investigation are:
I. Design of the FMS to include displays,
database, and lack of terrain displayed.
2. The psychological relationship of pilots to
onboard automation.
3. System wamings with 111 power when
spdbrakes are deployed
4. Lack of angle of attack information in the
cockpit for pilots to be able to achieve maximumperformance climbs.
5. Ambiguous naming (Columbia government) of
navigation aids.
6. Linguistic barriers between pilots and
controllers (Garrison, 1997).
On January 13, 1998, a Learjet 258 crashed
approximately two miles short of the George Bush
Intercontinental Airport in Houston, Texas. In this case, the
aircrew was conducting an approach into the airport using
an Instrument Landing System WS). The captain started
the approach but transferred control to the &st officer
shmly after passing the final approach fix (FAF).
Although the ILS indicator in the cockpit showed that the
aircraft was on the localizer, the glideslopeshowed that the
aircraR was well above glidepath. The captain elected to
continue the appmach by telling the first officer to increase
rate of descent to "catch" the glideslope @atq 1999). The
mew continued below the decision height and impacted the
ground. All data retrieved from the accident indicated that
the aircraft was actually below glidepath. An error was
detected in the glidepath indicator during the accident
investigation.
The NTSB determined that several incidents occurred
that led up to the Leajet going below the glidepath and
colliding with the ground:
1. The crew did not perform an approach briefing
that was required by the flight crew's company.
2. Thecaptain's decision to cuntinuetheapproacb
by transferring control to the first offim after passing the
FAF.

3. The captain's decision to continue the approach
while the glideslope indicator was showing well above
glidepath.
4. Theairplane'scorporateoperatortoproperly fix
theglideslopeindicator, that hadbeen reportednot properly
indicating correct glidepath information on a previous
flight (Katz, 1999).
It was also noted that if a Ground Proximity Warning
System (GPWS) was installed, it may havegiven the pilots
adequatewarning before impact with the terrain. Although
this may have helped to prevent this accident, a GPWS was
not required for this type of aircraft or operation.
An accident involving a Korean Aii B-747 happened on
August 6, 1997 in Guam. The aircrew was flying a
l o m l i - o n l y approach, when the aircraft impacted the
ground about three miles short of the Guam International
Airport (McKema, 1997). The aircraft was flying at night
in heavy rain and clouds. The NTSB determined the
probable cause ofthe accident was the captain's failure to
adequately brief and execute the nonprecision approach
(NEB, 2000). Other possiblemtributing factorsthatmay
have led to the accident are:
1. The first officer and flight engineer failed to
effectively monitor and cross check the captain's execution
of the approach.
2. The captain's fatigue due to a recent trip
returning fiom Hong Kong on August 4th.
3. Koreans Air's inadequate flight mew training.
4. The FAA's intentional inhibition of the
minimum safe altitude warning WSAW) system at Guam.
An interesting side note about the Korean Air accident is
apparently the low altitude alarms aboard the plane were
operating properly, but the pilots largely ignored them
(Jackson, 1998).
An accident involving a Express 11 Jetstream BA3100,
occmed while on a localizer back course in Hibbiig,
M i e s o t a on December 1,1993. According to the NTSB,
a breakdown in crew coordination was the probable cause
of the accident (Air Safety Center, 1999). This led to loss
of altitude a m m e s s by the flight crew dwing an
unstabilized approach at night and impacting the ground
short of the runway. According to the accident report,
contributing to the accident was:
1. Failure of the company management to
adequately address the previous identified deficiencies in
airmanship and crew resource management (CRM).
2. The failure of the company to identify and
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correct a widespread, unapproved practice during
instrument approach procedures.
3. TheFAA inadequatesurveillanceandoversight
of the air carrier (Air Safety Center, 1999).
Although the above examples are not the only
factors that contribute to CFIT type accidents, they can help
to formulate some common causes. All four involved some
type of degradation of crew communication which resulted
fiom a low situational awareness in the cockpit. In the
American Airlines accident, wrong data was entered in the
FMS and neither aircrew backed up the data. The Learjet
aircrew failed to conduct an approach briefing prior to
executing the approach. The Korean Aim crew failed to
monitor the captain's execution of the approach and the
action's of the Express I1 captain led to the breakdown in
crew coordination.
The next common factor in these accidents is lack of
advanced avionics or the proper use of the systems that are
on board the aircrafl. The Cali accident involved systems
that failed to warn the pilots of rapidly increasing terrain,
speedbrakes deployed or maximum pfonnance climb
information. Also, the accident prompted the FAA to
recommend a new system to be installed called the
Enhanced GPWS FGPWS). Information about this system
will be addressed later in this paper. The Leajet259 crash
involved using an inoperative glideslope indicator. In the
Korean Aii disaster, the Aii Traffic Control (ATC) system,
MSAW, was not working. If the MSAW system was
operating, the air traffic controller could have advised the
aircrew of possible ground impact. Also, this ose brings
out the fact that the low altitude warning a l m s were
working in the cockpit, but the aircrew iiled to take any
actions. Finally, in the Express 11 incident, the loss of
altitude awareness was due to possible actions of the
captain to limit time in severe icing conditions (AiiSafety
Center 1999). The findings by the NTSB also found that
if a GPWS system was installed, it may have given the
pilots enough warning to avoid collision with the ground.
Training Airerew in CFIT Prevention
According to Daniel Maurino, the coordiinator of the
ICAO flight safety and human factors program, the
introduction of advanced systems on a large scale, may
have produced two flaws:
1. It was technology-driven rather than humancentered.
2. It stopped short of the micro-level of system
design analysis (Maurino, 1993).

,,
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Maurino's analysis of the problem seems to indicate that
with the development of advanced systems,the human
element was not taken entirely into consideration.
In 1992, the Flight Safety Foundation @SF) and the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
organized a CFIT Task Force. The task force set as a five
year goal a fifty percent reduction in CFIT accidents (Flight
Safety Foundation, 1999). According to the FSF, the task
forceachieved that goal in 1996and 1997by concentrating
on four areas:
1. Distributed a Safety Alert to thousands of
operators on the use of GPWS.
2. Developed a CFIT checklist.
3. Created a video training tape titled "CFIT:
Awareness and Prevention."
4. Produced a CFIT Education and Training Aid
(Flight Safety Foundation, 1999).
The emphasis of these four areas deals with the pilot's
interaction with avionics and with each other. The goal of
each was to increase the pilot's awareness of possible CFIT
scenarios and to avoid the possibility of an accident. Each
were developed out of actual CFIT accidents to inaease
pilot awareness and how to react in similar situations.
The FAA's Safer Skies Initiative was established in
April, 1998 with the goal of reducing b l commercial
aviation accidents 80% by the year 2007 (Air Safety Center
,, 1999). Some of the recommendations by the FAA
include:
I. Adopting standard operatingprocedures which
deal with prevention of CFIT.
2. Revise training programs which would
incorporate CFIT training into CRM programs.
3. Training air traffic controllers in CFIT
prevention and the MSAW system (Air Safety Center ,,
1999).
With the development of CFIT prevention into the CRM
programs commercial operators can incorporate CFIT
training into their initial and recurrent CRM training. It
has already been established by the airline industry that
CRM has helped aircrew to inaease sihlational awareness.
With the addition of CFIT Waining, CRM will be able to
incorporate a high degree of awareness of possible
scenarios that can lead up to these types of accidents.
After the crash of the Korean Air 9-747 in Guam, the
airline's chief of flight crew operations, testified to the
NTSB that CRM training had been revised since the
accident. Captain Lee Jung Taek stated in his testimony
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Figure 2 (FAA, 1997) Part 121 & 125 CFIT Accidents 1969 - 1980
USA Part 121& 125

that co-pilots are now trained to repeat advice about
abnormal or dangerous conditions to the captain
(McKenna, 1998). One interesting note that was not
brought up in this investigatioh is the fact of cultural
differences. In some Asian cultures, it is unacceptable for
an underling to question a supemisor. This could impede
two way communication in the cockpit.
Current and Future Avionics Used to Prevent ClTT
W& these new training programs beiig implemented in
the commercial carriers, the other area that needs to be
looked at is avionics. One of the major causes in the
reduction of CFIT was the introduction of GPWS in the
mid 1970's. As the figure 2 indicates, the CFIT accident
rate has significantly declined since GPWS was introduced
but it did not eliminate it. As has been pointed out in this
paper, three reasons that may have attributed to that are;
1. Not properly training airaew to include CRM
training with use of GPWS.
2. Limitations in the system that will not give
warnings in critical areas of flight.
3. Aircrew ignoring the low altitude warning
indications.
Along with training aircrew in therecognitionand
avoidance of CFIT scenarios, the aviation industry has
developed several types of avionics to aid the aircrew in

CFIT accident reduction. Although GPWS had gone
through major upgrades and changes over the years, there
are still certain flight regimes that GPWS is ineffective in
giving adequate warning. It can only provide information
to the pilots on the terrain directly below the aircraft,
utilizimg a radar altimeter. If the terrain directly in eont of
the air& increases rapidly, the GPWS may not be able to
detect the increase in time to give the pilot adequate
warning to react. One of the findings in the American
Airlines accident in Cali, Colombia, was that the aircraft
did have a functioning GPWS, hut it was not effective due
to the rapid inneasing terrain @wnheh 1996).
The EGPWS system had been out for several months
prior to the December, 1995 accident in Cali. It was this
accident that prompted the FAA to encourage the airlines
to put the system in all of their aircraft (Evans, 2000).
What makes the EGPWS different !?om older versions, is
it has a memory database and a forward looking display
that tells pilots what the actual terrain is like ahead of the
aircraft. GPWS versions use the terrain change directly
below the airmail to wam the pilots. If the terrain was to
increase rapidly, GPWS may not give the pilots adequate
warning to avoid contact with the ground. EGPWS along
with a Global Positioning System (GPS), relies on a
worldwide database ofthe terrain that is loaded in the FMS
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and periodically updated. Pilots can see the terrain that is
in eont of the airaaft through an existing weather radar
display, Electronic Flight Instrument System display or
some other Multi Functional Display (MFD) in the cockpit
(Allidsignal, 1996).
A slightly different version of GPWS is called AutoGround Collision Avoidance System (Auto-GCAS)that has
been developed by the military. Auto-GCAS is a last
defense system that overrides the pilot's controls to
automatically execute a climb or turning recovery (Scott,
1996). The system assumes that the pilot is unaware of the
circumstance and takes over the controls momentarily.
Auto-GCAS uses a terrain database as well as a radar
altimeter to predict theupcoming terrain. When the system
predicts a possible collision with the ground, it
automatically executes the escape maneuver. If the any
componentsofthe system fails, the Auto-GCAS commands
the airaaft to climb. The system was succffshlly tested on
U.S. Air Force F-16 aircraft, but can be adapted to any
aircraft with varying escape profiles. (Scotf 1996)
Another unique sysrern that is being tested is the
Transponder Landing System (TLS). The TLS utilizes the
aircraft transponder and the Air Traffic Control Radar
Beacon System (ATCRBS) on the ground to give the pilot
position and attitude information (Pimu, 1999). The TLS
will provide the pilot with the same display as an ILS
would The TLS also has the ability to adjust the beam so
it would not be a bed signal as in the ILS, and would have
the ability to guide aircraft for landing out to 22 nautical
miles (Picou, 1999).
Although the EGPWS is the most advanced and an
improvement over the standard GPWS system, there are
still some inherent flaws in the system. The Allied Pilots
Association is lobbying for a system that gives pilots a four
dimensional view of the upcoming terrain (Goyer, 1998).
The EGPWS currently displays only a three dimensional
view or a bid's eye display using color codes to depict
terrain height in relation to the aircraft's current altitude.
The four dimensional system would also give the pilots a
graphical representation of approaching terrain, as well as
flight path projections (Goyer, 1998).
Aii trafficcontrollersalso have the ability to help prevent
CFIT. IfATC systems are working correctlyand controllers
are able to interpret the information, such accidents could
be prevented The MSAW system was created for just that
reason. There are two main reasons that thesystem has not
prevented such high profile accidents such as the American

Airlines in Cali, Columbia and the Korean Aii in Guam.
First, the system has to be installed. Currently, only the U.
S., Japan and Israel have the system (Phillips, 1999). The
second reason is the system has to be working conectly.
The MSAW system was installed, but not covering the area
when the crash occurred in the Korean Air disaster in
Guam.
Another interesting statistic suggests that execution of
non-precision approaches increase the rate of CFIT
accidents. A shldy by the Approach and Landing Accident
Reduction Task Force (ALAR) found that 50% of the CFIT
accidents occurred during the approach and landing phase
of the flight and 75% of those occurred at airports that did
not have precision approach navigation aids. The ALAR
Task Force was formed by the Flight Safety Foundation and
studied 156 CFIT accidents i?om 1988-1994 (Phillips,
1999). The study goes to suggest that replacing nonprecision approach systemswithprecisionapproaches,may
reduce the CFIT accident rate.
Concerns and Potential Problems
One concern that has been mentioned is the integration
of the advanowl avionics and the human machine.
Although systems aboard the airaaft are designed to help
the pilot avoid CFIT scenarios, if the airaew is not
sensitized and trained to use and interpret the avionics
correctly, it literally makes the equipment useless. The
investigation in Guam of the Korean Aii B747, indicated
that the altitude alert systems aboard the airaaft were
working correctly, but the aircrew chose to ignore the
appropriate warnings and continue the descent and
impactedtheground.Improper training and lack ofaircrew
coordination contributed to this accident and has been a
major factor in many more.
Another example ofthis involved a SouthwestAirlines B737 performing a hard landing at the Burbank-GlendalePasadena Airport on March 5,2000. The aircral? skidded
off the runway and slightly injured fifteen people.
Preliminary investigations indicated that the aircraft was
flying an unstable approach. An unstable approach is one
in which an airaafl;
1. is not aligned with the runway at a sufficient
height,
2. is not descending at a steady rate,
3. hils to capture the glideslope or correct vertical
profile,
4. does not attain the desired speed, or
5. does not establish the desired configuration
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(Slatter, 1997).
Further investigation of the Southwest Airlines accident
indicated the aircraft had a steeper than normal glidepath
of up to six degrees caused by a late descent past the FAF
(Phillips, 2000). The "'sink rate, pull up" voice warning
alarm lkomthe GPWS system soundedseveraltimesduring
theapproach and the aircraft approach speed was almost 60
MPH faster than the normal approah speed (Phillips,
2000). This recent accident illustrates the problem that is
still present with avionics and crew integration.
General Aviation (GA) and corporate aircraft are not
required to have such systems aboard their airaaft. Since
those type of aircrafl do most of the flying in the U.S.,
CFIT is a major concern for them. Although studies for the
CFIT accident rate for GA and corporate airaafi are not
noted in this paper, we can assume that it is a problem. So
why not install these warning devices in the aircraft? Cost
is the prohibiting factor for putting a system like GPWS in
these aircrqft.
Regional carriers also have concerns about more
advanced systems. The indusmhas spentmillionsin recent
years installing the GPWS in their fleet ofaircraft. Now the
FAA i s threatening to have all commercial aircraft install
the EGPWS in their aircraft by year 2001
(CommerciaVRegional Airline News, 1998). Currently,
U.S. major airlinesare under a voluntary program to install
EGPWS by 2003. The Regional Airline Association is
lobbying for a volunteer program similar to the majors for
installing the EGPWS by 2003. Estimatedcost of installing
the EGPWS system would be $23,900 for an aircraft that
already has the GPWS installed and $40,000 for a complete
system that would include a display in the coEkpit
(CommerciaVRegionalAirline News, 1998). The time line
set forth by the FAA may be unreasonable. As indicated
above, if the FAA gets its way, all commercial airaaft will

have EGPWS by 2001. According to Stuart Matthews,
president of the Flight Safety Foundation, it would take
twenty years before it's installed in every commercial
aircraft in the U.S. (Marks, 1998).
Conclusion
The first part in finding a solution to CFIT accident
prevention seems to be a comprehensive plan of proper
aircrew training in the following:
1. The use and coordination of avionics systems
that help prevent CFIT accidents.
2. Integrating CFIT scenarios into CRM in the
initial and recurrent training of aircrew.
3. Encourage open communication between flight
crew where pilots check each other in critical phases of
flight such as approach and landing.
4. Perform approach briefings to increase
situational awareness in the cockpit.
The second part of the solution deals with aircraft
systems in the aircraft. The proper use of altitude warning
systems is the key to accident prevention. Plans are being
developed for new systems, however, the FAA should take
into amunt the time and cost to efllectively integrate these
systems into the airline industry. Estimated total cost for
upgrades to the EGPWS system for the regional airline
industry would be in excess of $115 million
(CommerciaVRegional Airline News, 1998). This could
adversely impact the smaller airlines significantly. It is
unrealistic to assume that ifa new system is developed (like
the EGPWS), that it will immediately be put into use. By
utilizing the proper integration of aircrew training and
currentaltitude avoidancesystems, the CFIT reduction rate
can be reduced. New and improved systems should
continue to be developed and installed, but at a reasonable
pace that will not impede the growth of the airline
industry.0
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